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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers have lost their monopoly, and perhaps even their majority
market share, of the provision of legal services. In the past, lawyers
performed all legal and law-related services.1 However, in the modern
economy, that role is rapidly disintegrating. Accountants and enrolled agents
can now offer federal tax services, including some forms of legal
representation, to the general public.2 Legal service providers, who provide
document discovery and low cost bulk legal-related services to companies
and law firms, now provide business clients with litigation support,
document review, predictive coding, and business consulting at a fraction of
the cost of traditional law firms.3 These legal service providers include
Robert Half Legal, Pangea3, and Special Counsel. Some legal service
providers, usually called legal process outsourcers, contract with entities
outside the United States to outsource legal services.4 In search of novel,
business process management and efficiency-driven services, corporate
clients are deserting traditional law firms, or cutting back on “legal services,”
in droves.5
Commentators argue that American state-based prohibitions on
lawyers partnering with nonlawyers are a major factor behind the market
1

John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services
in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 110–12 (2000).
2
Id. (discussing the monopoly of lawyers over “legal work and services” in the
first half of the twentieth century).
3
Rachel Zahorsky & William D. Henderson, Who’s Eating Law Firms’ Lunch,
ABA J. (Oct 1, 2013), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
whos_eating_law_firms_lunch; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 104–05.
4
Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3 (describing the outsourcing of legal
services to China, India, and other rapidly developing markets).
5
Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3; see Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1,
at 103–07 (noting that “legal services” has an evolving meaning). At heart, legal services
means litigation work, transactional work, client representation by licensed lawyers, and all
services ancillary or necessary to carry those services out. Ancillary services include
document review, tax preparation and management, lobbying, discovery management, and
management consulting. Such ancillary services may or may not be done by a lawyer.
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changes, particularly increased competition by foreign law firms who can
partner with nonlawyers.6 These concerns and the 2008 recession have
encouraged the American Bar Association (ABA) to revisit the issue of
multidisciplinary practices and alternative law practice structures (ALPSs). A
multidisciplinary practice (MDP) is “[a] fee-sharing association of lawyers
and nonlawyers in a firm that delivers both legal and non-legal services.”7
ALPSs, in contrast, refer to business structures that have both lawyer and
nonlawyer partners, but only deliver legal services.8 A law firm, on the other
hand is “a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, Professional Corporation,
sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers
employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a
corporation or other organization.”9 The term “law firm” will only be used
throughout this article to refer to an entity completely composed of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. Alternative Business Structures is the term
used in the United Kingdom for multidisciplinary practice structures
permitted by the Legal Services Act 2007. The Legal Services Act permits
business structures that engage in legal and non-legal services with certain
restrictions.10
This article argues that, contrary to assertions by some legal
practitioners, state rules of professional conduct based on ABA Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 5.4 (Model Rule 5.4) may be liberalized to allow
multidisciplinary practices, without undermining lawyer professionalism,
confidentiality, or the professional independence of judgment.11 Furthermore,
103–07.

6

Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at

7

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1112 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “multidisciplinary

practice”).

8
For Comment: Discussion Paper on Alternative Law Practice Structures, ABA
COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, (Dec. 2, 2011) [hereinafter ALPS December Letter], available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-ethics
2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf (noting the terminology used in this area is a
constant source of confusion among scholars and the ABA Committees themselves).
Unfortunately, even the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 is often not entirely clear when
differentiating one type of entity from another. For example, the ABA Commission on Ethics
20/20 “clarifies” in their report that an ALPS is not a multidisciplinary practice.
9
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (1983) (defining “law firm”).
10
Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 72 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/resource (defining “alternative business
structure”); see Legal Profession Act 2004 (N.S.W.) s 134 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/lpa2004179/ (defining “incorporated legal
practice”).
11
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4; ABA, Variations of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer (Feb. 12,
2014) [hereinafter ABA, Variations], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_5_4.authcheckdam.pdf
(detailing
implementation of Model Rule 5.4 in the fifty states and District of Columbia). With the
exception of the District of Columbia, Model Rule 5.4 has been implemented in almost every
state in largely the same form. ABA, Variations. Some states have made minor changes to the
rule to allow “fee sharing” with the estate of a deceased lawyer within certain parameters. Id.
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the ABA can adopt the Consumer-Commercial-Contractual Model (CCC
Model) as a liberalized, but professionalism-protective version of Model
Rule 5.4. The CCC Model incorporates: (a) lawyer/nonlawyer partnership
without passive nonlawyer investment, (b) consumer and commercial
specific rules, and (c) professionalism protections.
This article presents its argument in three parts. Part II provides a
brief history of the prohibition on lawyer/nonlawyer partnership and Model
Rule 5.4, including recent efforts to allow some form of multidisciplinary
practices. Part III discusses possible models for prohibiting or regulating
multidisciplinary practices, including ethical and practical concerns with
current Model Rule 5.4. Finally, Part IV argues that the ABA may regulate,
rather than prohibit, multidisciplinary practices while still protecting lawyer
ethics and professionalism by adopting the CCC Model.
II. HISTORY
A. Pre-1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The legal profession has traditionally taken a two-pronged approach
to nonlawyers and the protection of the practice of law.12 The first prong
encompasses unauthorized practice of law provisions prohibiting nonlawyers
from engaging in the practice of law.13 Such provisions have been common
for at least a hundred years in many states.14 Most state professional rules
mimic ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 governing the
unauthorized practice of law.15 However, the “practice of law” is defined
differently in each state.16 Most state statutes prohibit not only individuals
from practicing law without a law license, but also corporations and other
entity structures, because such structures may contain nonlawyer
shareholders, members, etc.17 Enforcement of unauthorized practice of law
statutes has been sporadic, although the ABA did maintain a Standing
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law from 1930 until 1984.18
The second prong includes rules prohibiting lawyers from partnering
with or practicing with nonlawyers. Prohibitions on nonlawyer involvement
in the “business of law,” including financial and managerial involvement,
However, the fee sharing prohibition for nonlawyers and nonlawyer partnerships has remained
largely the same from state to state. Id. The current ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct will be referred to as “Model Rule 5.4” and “Model Rule 1.0.”
12
Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who
Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 579–82 (1989).
13
Id. (discussing various state rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law).
14
Id. (explaining the longevity of unauthorized practice of law rules).
15
Id. (discussing state adoption of Model Rule 5.5).
16
Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (describing the unauthorized
practice of law); MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.5.
17
Andrews, supra note 12, at 579–82.
18
Id. at 583–84.
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appeared in the ABA Canons of Ethics in 1928.19 Canon 33 prohibited nonlicensed individuals from holding themselves out as legal practitioners.20
Canon 34 prohibited division of fees between lawyers and nonlawyers, and
Canon 35 provided that the professional services of a lawyer should not be
controlled or exploited by a nonlawyer, non-law entity, or other
intermediary.21 Between 1928 and the adoption of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969, these cannons were consistently
construed by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances to
prohibit lawyers and nonlawyers from offering legal services in almost all
business forms.22 As non-incorporated forms of businesses exploded in the
1960s and 70s, so too did the extension of lawyer-nonlawyer partnership
prohibitions.23
The Canons were replaced by the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1969, which was quickly adopted in most states.24 Canons
44, 34, and 33 became Disciplinary Rules (DR) 3-101(A), 3-102(A) and
3 103(A).25 Additionally, DR 5-107(C) prohibits a professional corporation
from directing or controlling the lawyer’s professional judgment, and DR
5 107(B) prohibits a third party who pays for or employs a lawyer to render
legal services for another from interfering with the lawyer’s professional
judgment.26 The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
further expanded on the Disciplinary Rules with Informal Opinion 1241.27
Informal Opinion 1241, when read in conjunction with Formal Opinion 303
and the ABA Ethics Committee’s expansive definition of the practice of law,
effectively prohibits a lawyer from operating any “kind of for-profit business
organization in which a nonlawyer has a financial or managerial role, if the
business of the organization is law or law-related.”28

19

Andrews, supra note 12, at 584–87 (discussing the ABA Canon of Ethics and
history of lawyer-nonlawyer partnership prohibitions).
20
Id. (describing Canon 33).
21
Id. (discussing Canons 34 and 35).
22
Id. at 586–88 (describing ABA Ethics Committee action on Model Rule 5.4);
see, e.g., ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 297 (1961) (stating an
accounting firm lawyer may represent the accounting firm, but may not provide legal advice
to the firm’s clients); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 201 (1940)
(indicating that representing clients in patent applications is the practice of law and that
lawyers may not partner with nonlawyers to represent patent clients, even though the patent
office permits nonlawyers to represent clients in patent application proceedings).
23
Andrews, supra note 12, at 586–88.
24
Id. at 588–92.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 592–94; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op.
1241 (1973).
28
Andrews, supra note 12, at 592–94; Informal Op. 1241, supra note 27.

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014

5

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 6

570

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:565

B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 5.4 and the Kutak
Commission
In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules).29 The Model Rules, with various amendments, have been
adopted in all fifty states and the Model Rules have been amended fourteen
separate times between 1983 and 2002.30 The ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards, known as the “Kutak Commission,”
spent five years evaluating and revising the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility.31 The Kutak Commission’s proposal on nonlawyer
involvement in the practice of law, enshrined in Rule 5.4, proved to be the
most controversial.32 The Kutak Commission Model Rule would have read
as specified in Figure A below.33
By its very terms, the rule would have allowed lawyers to partner in
organizations in which a nonlawyer holds a management interest or where
nonlawyers hold stock or interests of the organization.34 The Kutak
Commission justified Rule 5.4 as a necessary change given the “complex
variety of modern legal services” that make it unviable for the bar to define
organizational forms that allegedly guarantee compliance with the ABA
Rules of Professional Responsibility.35 Additionally, the Kutak Commission
noted that exceptions to the legal service arrangements had “substantially
eroded the general rule, leading to inconsistent treatment of various
organizations on the basis of form or sponsorship.”36
However, the ABA House of Delegates explicitly rejected the
proposed Rule 5.4.37 The House of Delegates members opposed the Rule for
several reasons: (1) interference with lawyer professional judgment; (2) the
29

Andrews, supra note 12, at 593.
Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preface.html;
ABA,
States
Making Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption,
Chronological Order (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/chrono_list_state_adopting_
model_rules.html.
31
Robert W. Meserve, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards, Chair’s Introduction (Sep. 1983), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preface/chair_introduction.html.
32
Andrews, supra note 12, at 593–95.
33
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (Proposed Final Draft 1981)
[hereinafter
Kutak
Commission
Final
Draft
Rule
5.4],
available
at
30

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibi
lity/kutak_5-81.authcheckdam.pdf; see infra Figure A.
34

Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4 (explaining the contents of the rule).
Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4 cmt.
36
Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95.
37
Id. at 595–96. A full transcript of the ABA House of Delegate Sessions 28, 37,
and 45–48 in February 1983 has never been released.
35
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possible corporate ownership and operation of law firms, by companies like
Sears; (3) destruction of lawyer “professionalism;” and (4) other negative,
but unknown effects, on the legal profession.38 In the Kutak Commission
Rule 5.4’s place the House of Delegates adopted a substitute Model Rule
based on the prior Model Code provisions.39
C. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice and the
Commission on Ethics 20/20: Missed Opportunities for Liberalization
In August 1998, the ABA formed the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice to further “study and report on the extent to which
and the manner in which professional service firms operated by accountants
and others who are not lawyers are seeking to provide legal services to the
public.”40 The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, after much
investigation, recommended to the ABA House of Delegates that the Model
Rules be liberalized to allow for lawyers to partner with nonlawyers in
business entities.41 Specifically, the Commission noted that there was already
a trend toward legal and business services being offered in multidisciplinary
entities and that present rules should not inhibit development of new business
structures that provide better legal services and public access to the legal
system.42 Furthermore, the Commission expressly recognized that lawyers
already practice in settings with nonlawyers, including government legal
departments and union sponsored prepaid legal service programs, and
lawyers have maintained their professional independence in such settings.43
The Commission’s recommendation was that lawyers be allowed to
share fees and practice in concert with nonlawyers, subject to safeguards.44
These safeguards included reiteration of lawyer independent judgment, clear
disclosure to clients of the arrangement, limits of the representation and
client protections, multidisciplinary practices being bound by the

38
Id.; see infra Part III (discussing ethical concerns with nonlawyer/lawyer
partnerships raised by the 1983 ABA House of Delegates and others).
39
Andrews, supra note 12, at 595–96; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 5.4.
40
ABA, The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice: About the Commission,
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_
multidisciplinary_practice/mdp_abt_commission.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
41
Id.
42
Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 1529, 1541–43 (2000) (describing in detail the recommendations of the Commission
on Multidisciplinary Practice); M. Courtauld McBryde, The Future of Multidisciplinary
Practices in North Carolina: Love ‘Em or Hate ‘Em, North Carolina’s Only Option Is to
Regulate Them, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 202–04 (2001).
43
Stein, supra note 42, at 1541–43; McBryde, supra note 42, at 202–04
(discussing government legal departments and other professional settings where lawyers and
nonlawyers work side by side).
44
Stein, supra note 42, at 1542–43; McBryde, supra note 42, at 202–04.
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Professional Rules, and conflict of interest rules to the same extent as
traditional law firms. 45
However, when the Commission’s recommendations reached the
ABA House of Delegates in July 2002, the House unequivocally rejected the
proposals as contrary to preserving the core values of the legal profession.46
The ABA House of Delegates then passed Resolution 10F, which: (1) listed
core values of the legal profession, including undivided loyalty to the client,
independent judgment, client confidences, avoiding conflicts of interest,
maintaining a single profession of law, and promoting access to justice;
(2) encouraged state and local bar associations to vigorously enforce their
professional rules, particularly those surrounding the definition of “practice
of law;” (3) called upon the ABA Ethics Committee to draft rules regulating
strategic and contractual alliances and regulations with nonlawyer service
providers and organizations; (4) encouraged states who permit law firms to
own nonlawyer businesses to develop rules prohibiting nonlawyers from
owning and controlling the practice of law; and (5) discharged the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. 47
The Ethics 2000 Commission, created near the turn of the twentyfirst century to recommend broad changes to the ABA Model Rules,
proposed very minimal changes to Rule 5.4.48 Section (a)(4) was added
stating that: “a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit
organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the
lawyer in the matter.”49 In addition, section (d)(2) was revised to read: “a
nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position
of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a
corporation.”50 Forty-four jurisdictions also created state committees or
commissions to study the multidisciplinary practice issue, with mixed
recommendations.51 However, after the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice was disbanded in 2000, most state-based
initiatives were soon shelved or abandoned.52
Unlike past committees and commissions on the topic of
lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships, the Commission on Ethics 20/20 was the
45

Stein, supra note 42, at 1542–43; McBryde, supra note 42, at 202–04.
McBryde, supra note 42, at 204.
47
Louis H. Levinson, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Others: Coping with
the ABA Model Rules After Resolution 10F, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133, 142–43 (2001)
(discussing Resolution 10F); ABA, MPD Recommendation—Center for Professional
Responsibility
(July
2000),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecom10f.html.
48
ABA
Ethics
2000
Comm’n,
Rule
5.4,
available
at
46

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_
commission/e2k_rule54.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2014).
49
50
51
52

Id. (discussing revisions to Model Rule 5.4 after Resolution 10F).
Id.
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 7 (describing state action).
Id.
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first to propose a restrictive, yet liberalized, version of Rule 5.4 for ABA
consideration.53 The work of the Commission on Ethics 20/20 Commission is
ongoing, and the ABA House of Delegates has yet to vote on the
Commission’s proposed rule.54 Commentators, however, indicate
pessimistically that the Commission on Ethics 20/20 and ABA House of
Delegates are unlikely to adopt a new Rule 5.4 anytime soon.55
D. Current Model Rule 5.4
Current Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
is substantially similar to the rule adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in
1983, with the changes made by the Ethics 2000 Commission to sections
(a)(4) and (d)(2). Model Rule 5.4 has been adopted in some form in all fifty
states.56 Model Rule 5.4 has been interpreted by the ABA Ethics Committee
and state courts to prohibit nonlawyers from being partners or holding
financial interests in law firms.57 Also, the rule implicitly prohibits the
formation of publically traded law firms, because nonlawyers would be able
to hold the traded shares.58 Nonlawyers may work as independent contractors
or employees of a law firm, provided that such agreements comply with all
state professional rules, including those governing fee sharing (Rules 5.4 and
2.1) and supervision (Rules 5.1–5.3).59
Contemporary federal laws, including the Internal Revenue Code,
have limited areas that constitute the “practice of law.” Nonlawyers,
including accounting firms may now represent clients before the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office and tax courts provided that the meet the federal
53
54

Id.
See

ABA,

ABA

Commission

on

Ethics

20/20,

available

at

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on
_ethics_20_20.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (noting that the ABA Commission on
Ethics 20/20 is revising not only Model Rule 5.4, but other Model Rules as well, and has
made substantial progress in those areas); James Podgers, Summer Job: Ethics 20/20
Commission Shelves Nonlawyer Ownership, Focuses on Other Proposals, ABA J. (June 1,
2012), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/summer_job_ethics
_20_20_commission_shelves_nonlawyer_ownership/ (showing the Commission on
Ethics 20/20 has shelved the nonlawyer ownership issue in favor of working on other
proposals, at least for the time being).
55
Podgers, supra note 54 (describing the ABA and Commission on Ethics 20/20
deadlock on ALPSs and multidisciplinary structures).
56
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (providing the number of states that
have adopted Model Rule 5.4 in some form).
57
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, ABA Formal Op. 01423 (Forming Partnerships with Foreign Lawyers); ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, ABA Formal Op. 03-430 (Propriety of Insurance Staff Counsel Representing
the Insurance Company and its Insured; Permissible Names for an Association of Insurance
Staff Counsel); ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, ABA Formal Op.
95-392 (Sharing Legal Fees with a For Profit Corporate Employer).
58
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–59.
59
Id.
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statutory requirements.60 Furthermore, lobbying firms, management and
consulting firms, and investment banking firms have hired lawyers to
provide services to their clients that often bestride the gap between
nonlawyer business and investment services and the practice of law.61
Although the organized bars of many states have attempted to crack down on
the “unauthorized practice of law” by nonlawyers such as accounting firms,
these efforts have been far outpaced by the growth of legal services providers
and others providing law-related or quasi-legal services.62
E. A Word on the Business-Profession Dichotomy
Chief among the American and many state legal communities’
concerns regarding lawyer/nonlawyers partnership is the risk that the legal
community will be seen as a “business” rather than as a “profession.”63
These concerns are unfounded for two reasons.
First, business and professional behavior are not fundamentally
incompatible.64 Scholar Cindy Carson recognizes that a business and a
profession are entities that seek to promote the greatest societal good, the
former by maximizing profit and the latter by maximizing service.65 Profit
maximization in a capitalist economy often takes the form of increasing the
60
Id. at 105–08; Formal Op. 201, supra note 22 (explaining that nonlawyers may
appear before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, but a lawyer appearing before the same
office is presumed to be engaged in the “practice of law”).
61
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 105–08.
62
See generally Elijah D. Farrell, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: Who Is the Bar Really Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REV. 599, 599–629
(2000) (discussing state bar attempts, often futile, to reign in the unauthorized practice of law
by accounting firms) .
63
Paul D. Clement, Comments of Nine General Counsel on the ABA Commission
on Ethics 20/20’s Discussion Paper on Alternative Law Practice Structures (Feb. 29, 2012),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/
ethics_20_20_comments/ninegeneralcounselcomments_alpschoiceoflawinitialdraftproposal.au
thcheckdam.pdf (expressing concerns regarding lawyer professionalism in light of any
liberalization of Model Rule. 5.4); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 198–200 (noting
scholars have criticized various legal professionalism movements throughout the twentieth
and early twenty-first century as being smokescreens for “anti-Semitism, nativism, classism,
economic protectionism, and general elitism”); see Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius
Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse
of Early Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 2 (2005),
available at http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=
scholarlyworks. It is unclear if modern profession/business concerns stem, at least partially,
from the same roots. Andrews, supra note 12, at 616–17 (alleging that economic
protectionism can be read between the lines of contemporary justifications to prohibit lawyers
from practicing with nonlawyers).
64
Russell G. Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Rock and Roll, 14 WIDENER L.J. 907, 908–15 (2005) (recognizing and discussing
the business-profession dichotomy).
65
Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New Mismanagement: The Problem of NonLawyer Equity Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593, 605–07 (1994).
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quality of service provided to customers.66 Furthermore, a profession is
simply defined as, “[a] vocation requiring advanced education and training”
or “a type of job that requires special education, training, or skill.67
Traditionally, medicine, law, and the ministry were the only true
“professions.”68 However, that list has expanded substantially in the modern
era due to the growth in jobs requiring advanced education, such as
accounting and engineering.69 Noticeably absent from the professional
definition is whether the enterprise must be for-profit or not-for-profit.70 In
fact, modern law firms made up of “professionals” may be as engaged in the
“unethical” business of making money as nonlawyer businesses.71
Admittedly, a business is defined as, “[a] commercial enterprise
carried on for profit; a particular occupation or employment habitually
engaged in for livelihood or gain.”72 However, profit motive does not
automatically equal propensity toward unethical conduct and deficient legal
services.73 Undeniably, “business” considerations and behaviors, including
66
Leonard L. Berry et al., Improving Service Quality In America: Lessons
Learned, 8 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 32 (1994), http://areas.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/
marketing/facultystaff/zeithaml/selected%20publications/improving%20service%20quality%2
0in%20america-%20lessons%20learned.pdf.
67
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “profession”);
PROFESSION, Merriam-Webster Online (last visited December 2, 2013), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/profession?show=0&t=1386007280.
68
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “profession”)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 20 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1939) regarding the traditional
vocations defined as “professions”).
69
See, e.g., Business Professions, WIS. DEP’T OF SAFETY & PROF’L SERVS.,
http://dsps.wi.gov/Licenses-Permits/Credentialing/Business-Professions (last visited
Dec. 2, 2013) (listing the different “business professions” that require a licensure in
Wisconsin, including engineering and accounting); New York State Licensed Professions,
N.Y. ED. DEP’T: OFFICE OF THE PROFESSIONS (Sept. 24, 2013) (listing the fifty professions
requiring licensure in New York). It is ironic that Wisconsin juxtaposes business and
profession in the same heading, when the business-professional dichotomy is so strong.
Business Professions. It should be noted, however, that attorneys do not appear on either New
York’s or Wisconsin’s list of professions, but rather are regulated by the court system.
Business Professions; New York State Licensed Professions.
70
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226, 1329 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “profession” and
“business”).
71
Andrews, supra note 12, at 601–03.
72
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “business”).
73
Andrews, supra note 12, at 601–03 (stating that: (1) the assumption “profit
motive is bound to lead to inadequate or unethical legal services” has no empirical support and
contradicts our society’s fundamental scheme of fulfilling consumer demand; (2) the
assumption “corporations or laymen engage in the ‘sordid’ business of making money . . .
more than . . . traditional law firms” misstates current private law firm practice and
misrepresents the abilities of a current private law firms to seek money and current
corporations to seek purposes other than money; and (3) the assumption that profit motive is
incompatible with law “suffers from an over-simplistic, even arrogant, view of nonlawyers”
because the assumption, in turn, assumes that nonlawyers will enter the law business for only
one motive—to make money—and this sub-assumption stereotypes and ignores the fact that
many lawyers enter the law profession to make money). In particular, the requirement under
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economics of scale and efficient integration of services into a single product,
can be beneficial to a law firm, as they are with any business.74 As everyday
business activities become more intertwined with legal services, having a law
firm that is run with the efficiency, profit-cognizance, and long-term
planning of a business is not necessarily a bad thing.75
Second, lawyers’ assumptions that a lawyer monopoly on the
delivery of legal services is the only way to uphold the ethical standards of
the profession are presumptuous.76 Nonlawyers can and do recognize the
ethical rules and requirements of the legal profession.77 Indeed, many
nonlawyers are required to follow and uphold state ethical standards and
professional codes of conduct for their own business professions.78 Many
nonlawyers such as accountants and engineers have their own
professionalism statutes or rules of ethics, additional training requirements,
and examination requirements.79 Thus, suggesting that nonlawyers, simply
by virtue of being nonlawyers, cannot separate morality from money is
inapposite.80
Fears that multidisciplinary practice will herald the end of the legal
community as a profession are inconsistent with the realities of what
constitutes a “profession” versus a “business” in contemporary times.
Sarbanes-Oxley that many publically traded businesses create and implement corporate codes
of ethics seems to suggest that businesses and their partners, officers, and employees are
bound to a certain minimal standard of “business ethics.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 228–29, 249 (2003)
(Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
74
Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?: A Comparative
Perspective on the Future of Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the United States, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom After the Disintegration of Andersen Legal, 80 WASH. U.
L.Q. 589, 599 (2002); but see Carson, supra note 65, at 602–04 (suggesting that any monetary
savings through more efficient management of an entity providing legal services would go to
partners and the entity, rather than be passed on to clients and consumers).
75
Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3. Indeed, as mentioned supra, many
business clients are now demanding business like efficiency from their sources of legal
services and are turning to legal service providers when traditional law firms do not provide
the efficiency they seek. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text (noting increasing
demand for efficient solutions in legal services, not just competency).
76
Farrell, supra note 62, at 626–28.
77
Id. (discussing nonlawyers’ adherence and acknowledgement of the legal rules
of ethics and professional conduct).
78
Id.
79
See AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, AM. INST. OF CPAS (Oct. 31, 2013),
available
at
http://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/codeofconduct/pages/default.aspx
(accountant ethics code); Continuing Education: Professional Engineering and Land
Surveying, N.Y. STATE ED. DEP’T: OFFICE OF THE PROFESSIONS (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/pels/peceques.htm
(describing
continuing
education
requirements for professional engineers and land surveyors in New York); Professional
Engineer—Continuing Education, WIS. DEP’T OF SAFETY AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICES (last
visited Dec. 2, 2013), http://dsps.wi.gov/Licenses-Permits/Engineer/PECE (discussing
continuing education requirements for Wisconsin engineers).
80
Farrell, supra note 62, at 26–28; Andrews, supra note 12, at 601–03 (terming
the profession-business incompatibility argument to be an “over-simplistic, even arrogant
view of nonlawyers”).
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III. MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE AND ALTERNATIVE
DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURES
The problem of multidisciplinary practice structures has spawned
many different models for regulating and structuring such business entities.
The models can be roughly broken up into three categories: (1) models
without a formal business structure change; (2) models permitting nonlawyer
partnership and passive investment; and (3) models permitting only
nonlawyer partnership.81 Part III discusses the models in detail and briefly
indicates why each model is inadequate to address the problem of
multidisciplinary practices.
A. Models Without a Formal Business Structure Change
The category of models without a formal business structure change
includes MDP models that do not require lawyers or a law firm to change the
business structure (e.g., partnership, limited liability company, etc.) in which
they practice.82 These models include: (1) the cooperation or “status quo”
model and (2) the ancillary business services and contract/joint venture
models. All of these models work largely within the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in its current form and interpretation by state courts.83
1. Cooperation or “Status Quo” Model
The cooperation or “status quo” model maintains Model Rule 5.4 in
its current form.84 The arrangement, as previously stated, allows law firms to
hire nonlawyers as independent contractors or employees.85 However,
nonlawyers cannot hold partnership or similar management interests in a law
firm and cannot be passive investors in such an entity.86 Under this model,
the nonlawyers’ services can be bundled with the lawyer’s services under the
81

Many of these models are drawn from models created by the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Model numbers
are noted where relevant. See ABA, Hypotheticals and Models (March 1999) [hereinafter
http://www.
ABA,
Hypotheticals
and
Models],
available
at

americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_p
ractice/multicomhypos.html; see also Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–72
(laying out the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice models in detail and briefly
describing pitfalls and challenges with each).
82
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (discussing Models 1–4).
83
Id. (indicating that Models 1–4 work largely within the current professional
rules of conduct).
84
Id. (Model 1); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58 (discussing the
advantages and pitfalls of Model 1).
85
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58.
86
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1).
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heading of “legal services.”87 The nonlawyers’ services must be intimately
related to the lawyer’s services, and the client cannot pay solely for the
nonlawyers’ services uncoupled from the lawyer’s legal fees.88
Additionally, lawyers in the cooperative model are responsible under
Model Rule 5.3 to supervise the work of nonlawyers to make sure that the
“person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer,” including attorney-client privilege and confidentiality.89
Furthermore, despite the fact that a lawyer may not have an understanding of
the nonlawyers’ area of expertise, the lawyer must also supervise the
nonlawyer to ensure that the nonlawyer performs his or her duties with a
minimum level of competence.90 Unquestionably, this imposes a high level
of liability on the lawyer for any misconduct or lack of knowledge of their
“subordinate” but highly skilled nonlawyer employees.91 Additionally,
because nonlawyers cannot be partners in law firms, law firms are less able
to attract top talent with lucrative salary packages or raise funds through
sales of equity.92 Finally, as can be seen from the changing market for legal
services, the status quo model places law firms at a competitive disadvantage
vis-a-vis business service firms that are not bound by the restrictions and
Professional Rules of lawyers.93
2. Ancillary Business Services Model and Contract/Joint Venture Models
Similarly to the status quo model, the ancillary business services and
contract/joint venture models are based on options available under the
existing Model Rules.94 However, unlike the status quo model, these
methods of collaboration are far less common because they are on the fringes

87
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58.
88
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 154–56.
89
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b); ABA, Hypotheticals and Models,
supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58
90
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra
note 1, at 154–56 (showing that, depending on viewpoint, this duty to supervise for minimal
competence may not be much of an extension of state law primary liability for negligent
supervision, but it is still a significant burden for the legal professional to bear).
91
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58.
92
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58 (discussing nonlawyer
compensation in law firms).
93
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–58 (describing the competitive disadvantage of law firms under
the status quo model).
94
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60 (discussing the joint venture and ancillary business services
models loosely based on Model 3)
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of what is permissible under the professional rules of most states.95 Thus,
these methods present risk management and liability concerns for law firms,
often with far too little benefit.96
The ancillary business service model is based on Model Rule 5.7.97
Under the model, a law firm may own an interest in a firm that provides nonlegal services, such as a real estate broker.98 The law firm may refer clients to
the “ancillary” non-legal firm for various services, and conversely, the
ancillary firm will refer clients to the law firm for legal services.99
Similarly, the contract and joint venture models involve varying
levels of collaboration through contractual relationships between a law firm
and another legal or non-legal entity.100 Frequently, these contractual
relationships involve joint advertising.101 Law firms may also join together in
“legal services networks” that agree to refer clients to one another when
another firm has better regional or subject matter expertise.102
However, a significant disadvantage of both the ancillary and
contract/joint venture models are that the law firm may be required to
supervise the activities of the ancillary or other firm if the services are “not
distinguishable from legal service.”103 The law firm may also risk liability if
fee separation and clear lines of corporate authority are not maintained
between the law firm and nonlawyers business involved in the
95
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60.
96
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60 (explaining the significant professional liability risks of
adhering to Model 3).
97
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60.
98
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60 (describing law firms holding interests in nonlawyer entities
and the significant risks involved).
99
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60.
100
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 163–70 (stressing the collaborative aspects of these models).
101
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 163–70.
102
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 163–70; Two possible examples of this type of arrangement are the
Lex Mundi organization and DLA Piper’s “strategic alliance” partnership with the Cohen
Group, a business consulting firm. See About Lex Mundi, LEX MUNDI,
http://www.lexmundi.com/lexmundi/About_Lex_Mundi.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2014); see
also The Cohen Group, DLA PIPER, http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/aboutus/in-the-unitedstates/the-cohen-group/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). DLA Piper Global is itself an example of
the contractual and auxiliary models at work, given its numerous “member” or partner entities
that are separately organized and regulated throughout the world. Some entities operate under
the DLA Piper name, and some do not. See DLA Piper Global, Legal Notices,
http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/footer/legalnoticespage/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014).
103
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70.
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arrangement.104 Indeed, Model Rule 5.3 extends supervisory responsibility to
lawyers for all “nonlawyer[s] employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer.”105 This liability may extend to nonlawyer firm violations of the fee
referral, confidentiality, and advertising Professional Rules, among others.106
Furthermore, many law firms prefer to merge with another law firm to
maintain a unified firm culture and cohesive work product, rather than work
with multiple firms with uneven policies and work product.107 And finally,
all of these models are problematic in that they assume a one-for-one or
equal exchange of referrals between the two firms. In reality, that type of
relationship is rare.108
B. Models Permitting Nonlawyer Partnership and Passive Investment
Models permitting both nonlawyer partnership and nonlawyer
passive investment (multidisciplinary firms) are the trend in the worldwide
legal profession.109 In the past, the ABA considered and rejected the Kutak
Commission Model, which would have liberalized Model Rule 5.4 to allow
multidisciplinary practices. Outside of the United States, Britain has adopted
significant statutory modifications allowing such business combinations.
1. The Kutak Commission Model Rule
As previously mentioned, the Kutak Commission was tasked with a
complete revision of the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct.110 As part of
those revisions, the Kutak Commission proposed a new Rule 5.4, which
would have allowed lawyers to practice in full multidisciplinary practices.111

104

ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3-4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70 (analyzing fee sharing and liability risks with both
models).
105
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3; ABA, Hypotheticals and Models,
supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70.
106
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70.
107
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 165–67 (explaining the law firm “culture” concerns not
satisfied by auxiliary and contractual arrangements).
108
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski &
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70.
109
See Susan Hackett, Business as (Un)usual: Re engineering Legal Professional
Training, Development, and Competency to Remain Relevant to Clients, Hot Topics Seminar,
Business Law Inst., Hamline Univ. School of Law (Sept. 27, 2013) (discussing significant
changes in the training and structure of the legal profession, including the increased relevancy
of multidisciplinary practices and firms that provide more than just legal work).
110
See supra Part II.B (discussing the Kutak Commission).
111
Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4, supra note 33. The Kutak
Commission Model is roughly equivalent to Model 5 in the ABA Commission’s
Hypotheticals and Models. ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 5);
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The proposed Kutak Commission Model Rule would have allowed full
multidisciplinary practices, including lawyer/nonlawyer partnership in firms,
and passive financial investment by nonlawyers in law firms.112
However, such a structure raises significant ethical and professional
concerns.113 Firstly, such an arrangement would undermine lawyer
independent judgment, a requirement of Rules 1.7 and 1.8(f).114 Secondly,
there is concern regarding the application of lawyer confidentiality (Rule
1.6); disqualification (Rules 1.7–1.8); advertising (Rules 7.1–7.5) and other
state professional rules to nonlawyers and within lawyer/nonlawyer
partnerships.115 Lastly, the legal community fears that allowing such
arrangements will undermine the legal community as a “profession,” as
opposed to a “business,” leading to commercialization and corporatization of
the legal profession.116
a. Interference with Independent Professional Judgment
The most frequent argument made by critics of multidisciplinary
practices is that such arrangements will interfere with the lawyer’s
independent professional judgment.117 Primarily, the argument is that a
nonlawyer corporation or partner will control litigation or transactional work
by a lawyer and how money earned from that representation is distributed.118
As Thomas Andrews has noted, “[t]he possibility of interference with a
lawyer’s independent judgment cannot be denied.”119 However, as
proponents of multidisciplinary practices indicate, this risk may be
overstated.120 Very tellingly, many lawyers already work in structures where
their independent professional judgment may be impaired or directed by

Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 171–72 (discussing Model 5, the fully integrated
services model).
112
Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4, supra note 33; ABA, Hypotheticals
and Models, supra note 81 (Model 5); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 171–72.
113
Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95; ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra
note 81 (Model 5); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 171–72 (discussing significant
opposition by the ABA House of Delegates to the Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4).
114
Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95; ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra
note 81 (Model 5); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 171–72.
115
Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95 (explaining the major unknown application
of other model rules of professional conduct under a MDP structure).
116
Id.
117
Id. at 605.
118
In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910) (explaining the
concern that nonlawyers may interfere with litigation direction and monetary management).
119
Andrews, supra note 12, at 606–07.
120
Id. (arguing that the risk of interference with the independent judgment of a
lawyer may be overstated and oversimplified).
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others, such as in-house counsel and non-partner lawyers in law firms.121
However, ethical lapses by such lawyers have been rare.122
Furthermore, law firm capitalization and the issue of passive
investment in law firms frequently comes up as an independence of
professional judgment concern.123 The modification of law firm
capitalization and financial structures, and the numerous practical, logistical,
and ethical issues implicated, are beyond the scope of this paper.124 As the
Kutak Commission itself noted, “[t]o prohibit all intermediary arrangements
is to assume that the lawyer’s professional judgment is impeded by the fact
of being employed by a lay organization . . . . The assumed equivalence
between employment and interference with the lawyer’s professional
judgment is at best tenuous.”125
b. Application of the Rules
Multidisciplinary Practice

of

Professional Conduct

Within a

Another crucial concern regarding multidisciplinary practices is how
the state professional rules would apply to such entities.126 Most of the
organized bar recognizes and agrees that nonlawyers should be subject to the
state professional rules when they provide services in connection with legal
services.127 However, the answer is considerably hazy when the nonlawyers
are providing nonlegal services only.128
121

Id. (discussing lawyer-nonlawyer cooperation in corporations and nonpartner

lawyers).

122
Id. at 608 (noting an exception, the case of Enron, where in-house counsel may
have been complicit in the fraud perpetuated by senior management); Ameet Sachdev,
Enron’s Attorneys Criticized in Report: Evidence Found of Malpractice Examiners Say,
TRIB.
(Nov.
28,
2003),
articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-11-28/
CHICAGO
business/0311280188_1_neal-batson-enron-law-firms (describing possible Enron attorney
malpractice); See NANCY B. RAPOPORT, JEFFREY D. VAN NIEL & BALA G. DHARAN, ENRON
AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL Reader (2nd Ed.) (chronicling
ethical issues inherent in the collapse of Enron from a variety of perspectives).
123
Andrews, supra note 12, at 608.
124
Indeed, an entire paper could be written just on the issue of passive investment
in law firms and law firm long term capitalization and financing. This article will accept the
view shared by many in the legal community that passive investment by nonlawyers is
unnecessary and could potentially be detrimental to the legal profession. But cf. Tyler Cobb,
Note, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too! Appropriately Harnessing the Advantages of
Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 765 (2012) (discussing the benefits of law firm
passive investment).
125
Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95 (quoting the “legal background” section of
the Kutak Commission Report). The ABA Kutak Commission Report is no longer available
through the ABA website.
126
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 170–78 (describing concerns and
confusion as to how other Model Rules would apply to MDPs).
127
Id. at 174–75 (suggesting that nonlawyers should be subject to the legal rules
of professional conduct, at least to the extent that they provide nonlegal services incident to
legal services).
128
Id. at 174–78.
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Chief among the concerns is how lawyer rules of confidentiality,
advertising, and attorney client privilege will apply, if multidisciplinary
practices are permitted.129 The main fear is that confidentiality and attorneyclient privilege will be dead letter in an entity where lawyers and nonlawyers
freely share information.130 However, compliance with confidentiality and
attorney-client privilege should not be as significant a concern as detractors
would have it be. Rather, lawyers have been able to consult with and employ
nonlawyers for years in various capacities to assist with presentation of
litigation and other legal work.131 Confidentiality and attorney-client
privilege have been maintained, with rare exceptions.132 Thus, with the
appropriate modifications to the professional rules and interpretation by state
courts, confidentiality and attorney-client privilege ethical concerns may be
addressed and mitigated. Having nonlawyers sign confidentially agreements
may also be an option.133 Similarly, advertising by multidisciplinary firms,
like with lawyers, can be regulated by the state bars, mitigating but not
eliminating ethical concerns in that area.134
c. The Business-Profession Dichotomy Revisited
Lastly, practitioners have alleged that allowing lawyers to partner
with nonlawyers will diminish the professionalism and professional image of
the legal profession.135 The New York Bar has alleged that “MDPs ‘would
place lawyers in the ethically untenable position of allowing services to be
offered without client protections. In New York, we won’t allow profit to
replace principle as the touchstone of our profession.”136 As scholars and
practitioners have recognized, nonlawyer “unethicalness” is a legal fiction.137
Little evidence exists that nonlawyers are driven solely by a desire to make
money, as indicated in Part II.E.138
Additionally, the legal community, particularly smaller firms and
solo practitioners, allege that allowing nonlawyers, including corporations
and business entities, to invest in law firms would lead to Sears and other
retailers opening law firms in their stores.139 The smaller practitioners fear
that competition from corporate-run firms would drive smaller firms and solo
129

Id.
Id.
131
Id.
132
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 174–78.
133
Cobb, supra note 124, at 774–76 (suggesting confidentiality agreements as an
option to address confidential concerns).
134
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 174–78.
135
Andrews, supra note 12, at 600–03; Carson, supra note 65, at 605–07.
136
McBryde, supra note 42, at 205 (quoting the New York State Bar Association
President).
137
Andrews, supra note 12, at 600–03.
138
Id.
139
Cobb, supra note 124, at 770–71.
130
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firms out of business.140 This corporate-competition fear has become known
as the “fear of Sears.”141 Small legal practitioners argue corporately owned
law firms would lead to a diminution in the prestige and image of the
profession.142 This assessment may or may not be accurate. Results have
been mixed for corporate-owned professional structures, including
optometrists and physicians.143
Finally, it should be noted with caution that at least some members
of the bar as far back as the Canons for Professional Ethics drafting
committee
doubted
whether
multidisciplinary
practices
and
lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships even present threats detrimental to
maintaining an ethical profession.144 However, given the foregoing
discussion, this assessment, is probably incorrect.
2. British Statutory Action
In the past decade, Great Britain and Australia have both adopted
rules permitting multidisciplinary practices. Feedback regarding such rules,
at least from initial assessments, has been positive.145 For the sake of
simplicity, this paper will only consider the British Model, as the ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20 has recognized it to be the most relevant for
creating a comparable ABA model.146
The Legal Services Act of 2007 allows lawyers to develop
alternative business structures (ABSs) with nonlawyers, and provide legal
and nonlegal services within those structures in England.147 A nonlawyer
may work actively for the business as a partner or hold a passive investment
interest in the ABS.148 Significantly, in most cases, an entity that wishes to
have nonlawyer and lawyer partners must register and be licensed with the
relevant legal regulatory body, and that body must approve nonlawyer
140
Id.; Interview with Steven G. Brady, CEO, Minnesota Lawyers Mutual, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (March 28, 2014) (discussing small firm and solo practitioner concerns
regarding corporate ownership of law firms). These concerns include corporate-owned law
firms driving down fees for services provided primarily by solo and small firms. Such
concerns are similar to those raised by “Mom and Pop” stores against entities such as WalMart.
141
Cobb, supra note 124, at 770–71 (discussing the “Fear of Sears” argument).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 769 (quoting several members of the Canon’s drafting committee who
expressed doubts that lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships were inherently unethical).
145
Matthew W. Bish, Note, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting A Regulatory
Scheme That Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law Firms, 48 WASHBURN
L.J. 669 (2009) (discussing the profitability of Australian and British law firms that have
moved to a multidisciplinary practice structure).
146
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8 (discussing the British ABS model).
147
Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 72 (U.K.), http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
ACTS/acts2007/en/ukpgaen_20070029_en_ 1 (last visited Aug. 10, 2014); Bish, supra note
145, at 680–81.
148
Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90 (describing the Legal Services Act of 2007).
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partners who hold above a certain percentage interest in the entity.149 Thus,
Britain has effectively brought such nonlawyers, and the British law firm
entities themselves, under direct supervision of the state legal regulatory
authorities.150 Additionally, the model also includes a limitation on the
percentage interest a nonlawyer may hold.151 This limitation is based on the
strong, but questionable assumption that lawyers must retain majority control
of a legal entity in order to ensure the partners in that entity comply with the
professional rules.152 As with all multidisciplinary practice models, the
British model does include a qualifier expressly requiring that nonlawyer
partners not interfere with a lawyer’s ethical duties, including independent
professional judgment.153
British legislators believe that reducing the restrictions on legal
business structures will lead to a more consumer-friendly, flexible
environment.154 The legislature also posits that the structures will lead to
more comprehensive services and reduce transaction costs through “one-stop
shopping.”155 Furthermore, the availability of nonlawyers holding stock
options and other types of nonlawyer capital investment will theoretically
allow firms to attract the best talent and conduct better long-term capital
structuring of the firm.156
The Legal Services Act of 2007 has also spurred renewed litigation
in the United States by firms such as Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, who wish to
merge with larger U.K. firms to develop global practices.157 The effect that
such litigation will have on the development of Rule 5.4 in jurisdictions such
as New York and Connecticut is unknown at this time. Unfortunately, even
with the moderate number of entities reincorporating under British ABSs, it
is too soon to tell what the ultimate ethical effects of such entities will be on
the British legal environment.158
C. Models Permitting Only Nonlawyer Partnership
Several models, including the command and control model (D.C.
Rule 5.4) and the Commission on Ethics 20/20 model would liberalize
149

Id.; Legal Services Act (explaining registration and licensing requirements
under the Legal Services Act of 2007).
150
Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90; Legal Services Act.
151
Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90; Legal Services Act (explaining the percentile
limitation).
152
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 10 (discussing the reasons behind a
percentage cap on nonlawyer interests).
153
Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90; Legal Services Act.
154
Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the Appellate Div., 88 Fed
App’x 526, 526–27 (2nd Cir. 2012).
158
Bish, supra note 145, at 669–70.
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Model Rule 5.4 to allow nonlawyers to “partner” with lawyers in business
entities. “Partner” in this context means that the nonlawyer may hold a
financial or managerial interest, often a partnership or LLC membership
interest, in an organization engaged in the practice of law.159
1. The Command and Control Model (D.C. Rule 5.4)
D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (D.C. Rule 5.4) is
unique among state professional rules in that it is the only state rule to allow
some form of nonlawyer partnership.160 D.C. Rule 5.4 requires that
nonlawyers be active participants in the firm, prohibiting passive
investment.161 Furthermore, the rule requires that lawyers take full ethical
and professional responsibility for the actions of their nonlawyer partners.162
This responsibility and liability is not a major change from the situation
under the status quo model.163 However, it still does not address the
underlying problem that the organized bar is regulating only the lawyers in
such a partnership, and only indirectly monitoring the nonlawyers and entity
itself.164 As the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 has recognized, a
significant problem with the D.C. Rule is the unknown liabilities involved in
converting to such a form if a law firm practices in states other than D.C.165
As such, D.C. Rule 5.4 has not been adopted by many firms and only by
smaller firms.166 Thus, additional ethical concerns are hard to ascertain given
the small number of test cases.167 These problems are not easily solved
absent reform by other states.

159
See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4; Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act § 110, cmt. subsection (d), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/limited%20liability%20company/ullca_final_06rev.pdf
(discussing
ultracontractarianism and RULLCA’s rejection of that prospective).
160
D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4; ABA, Hypotheticals and Models,
supra note 81 (Model 2).
161
Cobb, supra note 124, at 783–84 (noting the rule specifically states that, “[a]
lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a financial
interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs
professional services which assist the organization in providing legal services to clients,”
provided that certain conditions are met).
162
D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b)(3).
163
See supra Part III.A.1. (discussing the status quo model).
164
See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b)(2) (stating that “[a]ll persons
having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest undertake [must] abide by
these Rules of Professional Conduct,” but not subjecting nonlawyers to the jurisdiction of
legal disciplinary authorities).
165
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 6–10.
166
Id.
167
Id.
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2. The Commission on Ethics 20/20 Model
Finally, the Commission on Ethics 20/20 has recently put forth a
proposed model for consideration by the ABA House of Delegates and
American Bar. The proposed model incorporates many features of D.C. Rule
5.4 and the British ABSs.168 These features include: (1) a limitation of the
services offered by an ALPSs to legal services; (2) a restriction that
nonlawyers be active participants in the entity, not passive investors; (3) a
percentage cap on nonlawyer interests in the firm; and (4) a “fit to own”
requirement for nonlawyers.169 The active participation element has been
otherwise addressed above.170
As previously mentioned, the percentage cap on nonlawyer
ownership is meant to keep ownership of the law firm in the hands of
lawyers, rather than nonlawyers. After numerous discussions, the
Commission has proposed a cap of twenty-five percent on nonlawyer
interests, via a complicated formula, as sufficient to maintain lawyer control
of the entity.171 The feeling is that keeping lawyers in control of the entity
will allow lawyers to maintain the ethical integrity of the lawyers and
nonlawyers in the firm.172 As previously mentioned, whether that reasoning
is sound is an unanswered question.173
On the other hand, the fit to own requirement is a new feature of
ABA proposed models. The fit to own provision requires that lawyers in the
firm execute some due diligence to ascertain the ethical character of
proposed nonlawyer partners and keep records of such investigation.174
However, as the Commission’s report recognizes, this requirement may not
go far enough because it does not bring nonlawyers under the disciplinary
authority of the state bars, and indeed does not even subject them to
investigation by the state character and fitness committee.175 Rather, the
proposed rule again places all responsibility on lawyers in the firm, which
may or may not be ethically and practically realistic.176
As discussed with the British Model and D.C. Rule 5.4 Model, the
proposed rule features significant benefits, including requiring that
nonlawyers follow the legal professional rules and protecting independent
168

See ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 5–10.
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, Draft Resolution 2.
170
See supra Part III.A–B (discussing the active participation component of some
suggested model rules).
171
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 5–10.
172
Id.
173
See supra Part II.E (discussing the business-profession dichotomy); Cobb,
supra note 124, at 790 (calling the twenty-five percent cap “seemingly arbitrary”).
174
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 5–10; Cobb, supra note 124, at 790–
92.
175
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 5–10; Cobb, supra note 124, at 790–
92.
176
Cobb, supra note 124, at 790–92 (discussing division of liability exposure).
169
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professional judgment.177 However, the modest improvements in the
proposal may not justify the mechanical and restrictive rule structure.178
Indeed, the MDP issue, including the Commission on Ethics 20/20 proposal,
has been so contentious that the ABA has failed even to develop policy on
the issue.179 Unfortunately, revisions to Rule 5.4 are stuck on a proverbial
merry-go-round between the Ethics Committees and ABA House of
Delegates, a journey that likely will not end soon.180
Figure A.
ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.4
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not
share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer
with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or
associate may provide for the
payment of money, over a
reasonable period of time after the
lawyer's death, to the lawyer’s estate
or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the
practice of a deceased, disabled, or
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to
the estate or other representative of
that
lawyer
the
agreed-upon
purchase price;
(3) a lawyer or law firm may
include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan,
even though the plan is based in
whole or in part on a profit-sharing
arrangement; and
(4) a lawyer may share courtawarded legal fees with a nonprofit
177
178

made).

The Kutak Commission Proposed
Rule 5.4
A lawyer may be employed by an
organization in which a financial
interest is held or managerial
authority is exercised by a nonlawyer,
or by a lawyer acting in a capacity
other than that of representing clients,
such as a business corporation,
insurance company, legal services
organization or government agency,
but only if the terms of the
relationship provide in writing that:
(a) there is no interference
with
the
lawyer’s
independence of professional
judgment or with the clientlawyer relationship;
(b) information relating to
representation of a client is
protected as required by rule
1.6;
(c) the arrangement does not
involve
advertising
or
personal
contact
with
prospective clients prohibited
by rules 7.2 and 7.3; and

Id. at 790-98.
Id. (suggesting that further alterations to the Commission rule need to be

179

James Podgers, ABA Ethics Opinion Sparks Renewed Debate over Nonlawyer
Ownership
of
Law
Firms,
ABA
J.
(Dec.
1,
2013),
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/aba_ethics_opinion_sparks_renewed_debate_ov
er_nonlawyer_ownership_of_law_fi/ (discussing recent ABA action, or rather inaction, on
Rule 5.4).
180
Id. (noting more than one commentator laments that action on Rule 5.4 may
necessarily come from the states, rather than national-level policy from the ABA).
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organization that employed, retained
or recommended employment of the
lawyer in the matter.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a
partnership with a nonlawyer if any
of the activities of the partnership
consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a
person who recommends, employs,
or pays the lawyer to render legal
services for another to direct or
regulate the lawyer's professional
judgment in rendering such legal
services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with
or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized
to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any
interest therein, except that a
fiduciary representative of the estate
of a lawyer may hold the stock or
interest of the lawyer for a
reasonable
time
during
administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate
director or officer thereof or
occupies the position of similar
responsibility in any form of
association other than a corporation;
or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to
direct or control the professional
judgment of a lawyer.
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(d) the arrangement does not
result in charging a fee that
violates rule 1.5.
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The Commission on Ethics
20/20 Rule 5.4
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not
share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer
with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or
associate may provide for the
payment of money, over a reasonable
period of time after the lawyer’s
death, to the lawyer's estate or to one
or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the
practice of a deceased, disabled, or
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the
estate or other representative of that
lawyer the agreed-upon purchase
price;
(3) a lawyer or law firm may
include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan,
even though the plan is based in
whole or in part on a profit-sharing
arrangement; and
(4) a lawyer or law firm may do
so pursuant to paragraph (b); and
(5) a lawyer may share courtawarded legal fees with a nonprofit
organization that employed, retained
or recommended employment of the
lawyer in the matter.
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a
law firm in which individual
nonlawyers in that firm hold a
financial interest, but only if:
(1) the firm’s sole purpose is
providing legal services to clients;
(2) the nonlawyers provide
services that assist the lawyer or law
firm in providing legal services to
clients;
(3) the nonlawyers state in
writing that they have read and
understand the Rules of Professional
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D.C. Rule 5.4

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not
share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer
with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or
associate may provide for the
payment of money, over a reasonable
period of time after the lawyer’s
death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one
or more specified persons;
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to
complete unfinished legal business of
a deceased lawyer may pay to the
estate of the deceased lawyer that
proportion of the total compensation
which
fairly
represents
the
servicescompensation that fairly
represents the services rendered by
the deceased lawyer. A lawyer who
purchases the practice of a deceased,
disabled, or disappeared lawyer may,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule
1.17, pay to the estate or other
representative of that lawyer the
agreed-upon purchase price.
(3) A lawyer or law firm may
include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan,
even though the plan is based in
whole or in part on a profit-sharing
arrangement;
(4) Sharing of fees is permitted
in a partnership or other form of
organization which meets the
requirements of paragraph (b); and
(5) A lawyer may share legal
fees, whether awarded by a tribunal
or received in settlement of a matter,
with a nonprofit organization that
employed, retained, or recommended
employment of the lawyer in the
matter and that qualifies under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
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Conduct and agree in writing to
undertake to conform their conduct to
the Rules;
(4) the lawyer partners in the law
firm are responsible for these
nonlawyers to the same extent as if
the nonlawyers were lawyers under
Rule 5.1;
(5) the nonlawyers have no
power to direct or control the
professional judgment of a lawyer,
and the financial and voting interests
in the firm of any nonlawyer are less
than the financial and voting interest
of the individual lawyer or lawyers
holding the greatest financial and
voting interests in the firm, the
aggregate financial and voting
interests of the nonlawyers does not
exceed [25%] of the firm total, and
the aggregate of the financial and
voting interests of all lawyers in the
firm is equal to or greater than the
percentage of voting interests
required to take any action or for any
approval;
(6) the lawyer partners in the
firm make reasonable efforts to
establish that each nonlawyer with a
financial interest in the firm is of
good character, supported by
evidence of the nonlawyer’s integrity
and professionalism in the practice of
his or her profession, trade or
occupation, and maintain records of
such inquiry and its results; and
(7)
compliance
with
the
foregoing conditions is set forth in
writing.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person
who recommends, employs, or pays
the lawyer to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate the
lawyer’s professional judgment in
rendering such legal services.
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Revenue Code.
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a
partnership or other form of
organization in which a financial
interest is held or managerial
authority is exercised by an
individual nonlawyer who performs
professional services which assist the
organization in providing legal
services to clients, but only if:
(1)
The
partnership
or
organization has as its sole purpose
providing legal services to clients;
(2) All persons having such
managerial authority or holding a
financial interest undertake to abide
by these Rules of Professional
Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a
financial interest or managerial
authority in the partnership or
organization
undertake
to
be
responsible for the nonlawyer
participants to the same extent as if
nonlawyer participants were lawyers
under Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are
set forth in writing.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person
who recommends, employs, or pays
the lawyer to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate the
lawyer’s professional judgment in
rendering such legal services.
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(d) A fiduciary representative of the
estate of a lawyer may hold the stock
or interest of the lawyer in a firm for
a
reasonable
time
during
administration.

IV. THE CONSUMER-COMMERCIAL-CONTRACTUAL
MODEL (CCC MODEL)
Each of the models previously proposed has significant flaws,
including confidentiality, imputation, and supervision. Unfortunately, the
core of the problem is that past models do not easily unite multidisciplinary
practice with the unique professional rules and culture of the American legal
community. In contrast, this article proposes a model that incorporates both a
liberalization of Rule 5.4 and a pragmatic approach to melding the model to
address professionalism concerns and the unique contours of the American
market and legal community. Part A states the main premises of the CCC
Model and the text of the proposed rule itself. Part B discusses the rule and
the ethical and practical problems the rule addresses. Part C briefly discusses
the challenges and disadvantages of adopting the CCC Model.
A. The CCC Model: Premise and Text
The model is based on four premises: (a) there are significant
concerns with incorporated law firms with non-lawyer shareholders (passive
investment); (b) having Wal-Mart or Sears hire lawyers to work in “WalMart law firms” would not comport with the professional rules or lawyer’s
image as a “profession”; (c) commercial entities are sophisticated and need
access to lawyer/non-lawyer combinations of services while consumers
cannot as easily understand such entities; and (d) ultra-contractarianism is a
growing trend in business.
The CCC Model for Rule 5.4 would amend sections (a)(4) and (b)–
(c) as follows:
(4) Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other
form of organization which meets the requirements of
paragraph (b); and . . . .
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or
unincorporated business entity in which a financial interest
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is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual
nonlawyer, only if:
(1) The partnership or other form of unincorporated
business entity is designated a “Multidisciplinary Firm”
by the Secretary of State of the partnership or
unincorporated business entity’s state of organization.
(2) All nonlawyers are active participants in the
Multidisciplinary Firm. Active participant means that
the individual nonlawyer actively provides professional,
or other services on behalf of the Multidisciplinary Firm
or is otherwise engaged in the day to day affairs of the
Multidisciplinary Firm. Nonlawyers may not be
organizations, entities, or solely investors or passive
investors.
(3) All persons, lawyers and nonlawyers, having such
managerial authority or holding a financial interest
undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional
Conduct, except as specified in section (7). All rules
including confidentiality, conflicts of interest,
imputation, and advertising shall apply to nonlawyers
and lawyers in a firm, subject to section (7).
(4) Where a nonlawyer is subject to an ethical or
professional code of conduct or State or Federal law
(collectively “Nonlawyer Ethics Code”) by virtue of his
or her profession, licensure, or similar affiliation, the
nonlawyer shall be bound by both the Nonlawyers
Ethics Code and these Rules of Professional Conduct. If
the Nonlawyer Ethics Code and these Rules of
Professional Conduct both address an issue, the
nonlawyers shall follow the more restrictive rule. If the
Nonlawyer Ethics Code and these Rules of Professional
Conduct directly conflict, the nonlawyers shall, to the
extent possible, seek guidance on a proper course of
action from the relevant lawyer and nonlawyers
professional ethics authorities. If the direct conflict
involves a mandatory disclosure of information or client
misconduct a nonlawyer must make under a Nonlawyer
Ethics Code, the nonlawyer shall simultaneously make
the disclosure and notify the legal disciplinary authority
of the jurisdiction where the Multidisciplinary Firm is
registered. The Multidisciplinary Firm shall also
immediately withdraw from representing and providing
services to the client.
(5) All nonlawyers with a managerial or financial
interest in the Multidisciplinary Firm agree to be subject
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to the jurisdiction of the following state legal
disciplinary authorities:
(A) Disciplinary authority of the state of
organization for the Multidisciplinary Firm;
(B) For conduct in connection with a matter
pending before a tribunal, the disciplinary
authority of the tribunal and jurisdiction in
which it sits, unless the tribunal’s rules
provide otherwise.
(6) The lawyers and nonlawyers who have a financial
interest or managerial authority in the Multidisciplinary
Firm undertake to be responsible for the lawyer and
nonlawyers participants to the same extent as if
nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rules 5.1–
5.3.
(7) The following section applies only to Commercial
Clients. A Commercial Client is any individual or entity
which does not meet the definition of consumer in
§ 1-201(11) of the UCC. A Commercial Client and the
multidisciplinary entity may agree in a contract for
representation or other written agreement, signed by
both parties, to vary the application of these Professional
Rules of Conduct with regard to nonlawyers in the
Multidisciplinary Firm, provided that:
(A) The work provided by the nonlawyers
will not be used exclusively to assist with or
in connection with legal services being
provided to the Commercial Client;
(B) The agreement does not violate any
Nonlawyer Ethics Codes or these Rules of
Professional Conduct;
(C) The Commercial Client is advised in
writing to seek independent legal counsel
before signing the agreement;
(D) The Commercial Client may not waive
application of these Rules of Professional
Conduct to lawyers involved in the
provision of legal or nonlegal services in a
Multidisciplinary Firm;
(E)
The
Commercial
Client
and
Multidisciplinary Firm may structure the
representation of the client in any manner
they see fit provided that the agreement and
structure complies with all Nonlawyer
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Ethics Codes; these Rules of Profession
Conduct, and state and Federal Laws; and
(F) If no agreement under this section has
been made, the Multidisciplinary Firm’s
representation and provision of services to
the Commercial Client shall be governed by
the provisions of section (8).
(8) The following section applies only to Consumer
Clients. A Consumer Client is an individual who meets
the definition of consumer in § 1-201(11) of the UCC.
The contract for representation between a Consumer
Client and the Multidisciplinary Firm shall contain the
following information:
(A) A clear statement of the scope of the
representation, including specific legal
services and nonlegal services that may be
provided to the Consumer Client;
(B) A provision stating that the
representation is being provided by a
Multidisciplinary Firm and a brief
description of the nonlegal services
provided by nonlawyers in the firm;
(C) A clause in bold, 14 font, stating that the
nonlawyers
and
lawyers
in
the
Multidisciplinary Firm are bound by these
Rules of Professional Conduct in their
representation or provision of all services,
legal or nonlegal, to the Consumer Client;
and
(D) All other information required by Rule
1.5 or these Rules of Professional Conduct.
(9) A Certificate of Multidisciplinary Practice shall be
filed with the Secretary of State and disciplinary
authorities of the Multidisciplinary Firm’s state of
organization. The Certificate shall contain:
(A) The name of the partnership or
organization;
(B) The names of all nonlawyers with
managerial or financial interests in the
partnership or organization;
(C) An affirmation by the Multidisciplinary
firm and all nonlawyers in the firm that they
will abide by the conditions set forth in Rule
5.4(b)(1) through (b)(8) and Rule 5.4(c);
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(D) An affirmation by all nonlawyers in the
Multidisciplinary firm that they will not
place limitations on, direct or otherwise
interfere with the independent professional
judgment of the lawyers in the firm.
(E) A partnership or organization shall file
an amendment to the Certificate of
Multidisciplinary Practice within thirty (30)
days of a nonlawyer with a managerial or
financial interest joining or disassociating
from the firm.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends,
employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional
judgment in rendering such legal services.181
B. The CCC Model Addresses Many Ethical and Practical
Problems with Multidisciplinary Practices and Past Proposed
Rules 5.4
The CCC Model addresses many of the ethical and practical issues
raised by liberalization of Model Rule 5.4 to allow multidisciplinary
partnerships. Firstly, section (b)(2) requires that a nonlawyer who wishes to
have a financial or managerial interest in a multidisciplinary firm be an
individual and an active participant.182 The individual limitation reiterates the
longstanding rule that lawyers (and now, by extension, nonlawyers), not law
firms or other entities, are regulated by the legal professional bars.183
Furthermore, restricting nonlawyers with managerial or financial interests to
individuals also prevents business entities or organizations such as Walmart
or Sears from holding interests in or operating multidisciplinary firms.184

181

Note that proposed sections (a)(4) and (c) are taken almost verbatim from
current D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(4),
(c). Additionally, all other existing sections of Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4, except
those designated, would remain the same.
182
CCC Model 5.4(b)(2).
183
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (stating that, “A lawyer admitted
to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction,
regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs,” but saying nothing about law firms); but see
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 489–532 (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_8.pdf (describing federal sentencing
guidelines for “organizations,” usually corporations, accused of crimes).
184
See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text (describing the “Fear of
Sears” problem and concerns that multidisciplinary firms operated by large corporations might
drive smaller law firms out of business).
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Similarly, the active participant limitation restricts nonlawyers in a
multidisciplinary firm to active partnership and work for the firm.185 There is
always a risk that non-lawyers will influence the independent professional
judgment of lawyers in a multidisciplinary firm; but, the risk of such
influence harming the client is lessened when nonlawyer managers or
financial interests have an active stake in maintaining that client relationship
and may even be providing services to the client, rather than simply holding
a passive investment where the only concern is a monetary return.186
Effectively, the risk of interference with lawyer independent judgment in the
proposed multidisciplinary firm is no greater than that in a contemporary law
firm or in-house legal department.187 Section (c) restates and reinforces the
prohibition on interference in independent profession judgment by all
persons who recommend, pay, or employ a lawyer.188 Presumably, this
section’s prohibition would include, as does the current rule, interference by
all persons, including other lawyers, nonlawyers, and third parties who pay
for a client’s legal services.189
However, unlike D.C. Rule 5.4 and the Commission on Ethics 20/20
Rule 5.4, the CCC Model does not limit the services provided by a
multidisciplinary firm to “legal services” and nonlawyer services assisting
the provision of legal services.190 As a practical matter nonlawyers,
185
See supra notes 159–167 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. Rule 5.4,
which limits nonlawyer partners to active participation and work for the firm, although it does
not expressly prohibit passive investment); supra Part III.C.2 (describing the Commission on
Ethics 20/20’s suggested rule, which requires active participation by nonlawyers in the firm
and limits services provided by the firm to legal services to further that requirement).
186
See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (describing passive
investment and lawyer independence of judgment); supra notes 64–80 (explaining the
business-profession dichotomy and the concern that multidisciplinary practice may make the
legal profession focused on profit, rather than provision of better client services).
187
See supra note 121 and accompanying text (stating that law firms, in-house
legal departments, and insurance company payment of lawyers on behalf of the insured
already raise lawyer independence of judgment concerns, but are still permitted under the
professional rules).
188
See ELIZABETH BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 284–85 (7th ed. 2011) (discussing the prohibition on third party and insurance
interference in the independent professional judgment of the lawyer under Rule 2.1); CCC
Model 5.4(c).
189
See supra notes 117–125 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer
independence of judgment); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt. 2
(explaining that existing Model Rule 5.4(c) reinforces the prohibition on third parties
interfering with the lawyer’s professional judgment in Model Rule 1.8). Section (c) is an exact
copy of current Model Rule 5.4(c) in most states, and thus, at least presumably would be
interpreted by state disciplinary authorities and courts the same way as it has been in the past.
Id.
190
See supra notes 159–167 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C.
limitation that permits nonlawyers in a lawyer/nonlawyer entity to provide services ancillary
to the provision of legal services, but not to have clients and provide services unattached from
the provision of legal services); ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 10–13 (describing
the Commission on Ethics 20/20 limitation on services provided in an ALPS to legal services).
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particularly highly skilled professionals, are unlikely to accept working only
for clients receiving legal services when they will be compensated highly for
their client roster by a nonlawyer business firm.191 Additionally, the CCC
Model contains no percentage limitation on the interests nonlawyers may
hold in a multidisciplinary firm.192 Instead, the CCC Model protects client
interests by requiring different initial disclosures by multidisciplinary firms
for consumer clients versus commercial clients, as discussed below.193
Sections (b)(3) through (b)(6) address whether nonlawyers in a
multidisciplinary firm are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, a
point of frequent concern among practitioners and client protection
advocates.194 The rule lays out the unambiguous rule that nonlawyers are
subject to the state professional rules of the jurisdiction in which the
multidisciplinary firm is organized, unless waived in specific circumstances
by a commercial client.195 Furthermore, section (b)(4) addresses the
circumstances where a nonlawyer ethics code governs the conduct of a
nonlawyer in a multidisciplinary firm, a point not addressed by past proposed
rules.196 Section (b)(4) adopts a client and public protectionist approach. It
requires nonlawyers to comply with the most restrictive rule and make
mandatory disclosures under the Rules of Professional Conduct, a state
statute, or other nonlawyer code of ethics even when another ethics code
prohibits such disclosures.197 Thus, nonlawyers cannot hide behind the
Professional Rules of Conduct as an excuse not to make disclosures required
by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or other statutes.198

191

Interview with Michael Roberts, Business Consultant, Mahto Wacipi Ltd., in
Saint Paul, Minn. (Sep. 15, 2013) (discussing his work as a business consultant for a number
of corporations and firms, where he is effectively paid to a great extent for his network
connections, like many other nonlawyer business professionals and lawyers).
192
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 10–13 (proposing a twenty-five
percent cap on nonlawyer interests held in an ALPS); see supra notes 145–158 and
accompanying text (discussing the British ABS and the twenty-five percent nonlawyer
limitation).
193
ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 10–13 (stating that the limitation on
the percentage of a law firm held by nonlawyers is meant to protect clients). The ALPS
December Letter provides no support for its assertion that having nonlawyers limited to a
certain percentage ownership interest will protect client interests. Id.; See infra notes 199–201
(laying out the commercial versus consumer client disclosure differences in the CCC Model).
194
See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text (explaining that most
practitioners agree that nonlawyers should be subject to the legal Rules of Professional
Conduct when providing services ancillary to legal services, but that practitioners are divided
on whether those rules should apply to all services, law-related or nonlegal, that a nonlawyer
provides).
195
CCC Model 5.4(b)(3).
196
Supra Part III (discussing proposed Rule 5.4 models, with no mention of
nonlawyer codes of ethics and conflict between legal codes of conduct and nonlawyer ethics
codes); CCC Model 5.4(b)(4).
197
CCC Model 5.4(b)(4).
198
See supra note 73 (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
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A unique feature of the proposed CCC Model, though, is the
distinction drawn between commercial clients and consumer clients in
sections (b)(7) and (b)(8). The separate treatment of the two groups of clients
is necessary for two reasons. First, the ABA Model Code of Professional
Conduct already treats representation of an entity differently than
representation of an individual client.199 The consumer-commercial client
distinction merely expands the ABA Model Code treatment of the lawyerentity relationship to specify that representation of a sophisticated
businessperson in the functions of a business should be treated differently
than representation of an individual accused of a crime or obtaining a
divorce. Secondly, consumer protection and differentiation between
commercial and consumer transactions is a growing trend.200 For example,
many states differentiate between commercial entities and consumers for real
estate disclosures, UCC secured transactions, and consumer credit
lawsuits.201
Furthermore, sections (b)(7) and (b)(8) adopt a mixed ultraUltra-contractarianism
or
simply
contractarianism
approach.202
contractarianism refers to the modern trend in unincorporated business
statutes that allow incorporators, organizers, partners, etc. . . . to modify by
“contract” the default rules to suit the business’s needs.203 Section (b)(7),
applicable only to commercial clients, extends this trend by allowing
commercial clients and MPDs to contractually structure their relationship as
they see fit.204 As John S. Dzienkowski and Robert J. Peroni recognized,
199
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (governing the representation
of entities by lawyers).
200
MINN. STAT. § 336.9-102(a)(22), (26) (2013) (defining consumer debtor and
consumer transactions for purposes of secured transactions); MINN. STAT. § 491A.01 (2013)
(stating that the Minnesota Conciliation Court jurisdiction is limited to certain “consumer
credit transactions”); MINN. STAT. § 513.52 (2013) (noting residential real estate versus
commercial property specialized seller disclosure requirements); see also William D. Warren
& Steven D. Walt, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 34, 49, 311 (9th ed. 2013)
(discussing consumer and nonconsumer debtor and transaction differences in Article 9
treatment including after-acquired property, automatic perfection, and strict foreclosure).
201
See supra note 200.
202
See CCC Model 5.4(b)(7)–(8).
203
Daniel S. Kleinberger, Careful What You Wish For—Freedom of Contract and
the Necessity of Careful Scrivening, 5 ESOURCE 6, 19–23 (Dec. 2006), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0054/materials/pp7.pdf
(discussing
Delaware’s contractarianist approach to corporation and unincorporated business entity
statutes ); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (e) (West 2013). Delaware’s LLC and
corporation statutes are a prime example of this “ultra-contractarianism” trend. Delaware
statutes permit incorporators or organizers to completely eliminate officer, manager, or
director duty of loyalty through the articles of incorporation, bylaws, management agreement,
or similar contract; REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 110,
cmt.
subsection
(d),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
limited%20liability%20company/ullca_final_06rev.pdf (referencing the ultra-contractarianism
trend).
204
CCC Model 5.4(b)(7).
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“[t]he premise in allowing a single entity MDP is that professionals should
be free to structure the entity in whatever way best serves the clients.”205 This
rationale also extends to flexibility in structuring the multidisciplinary firm’s
relationship with its commercial clients to better meet the needs of that client
base, while providing meaningful default protections to consumer clients.
Additionally, the rule addresses practical concerns. First, section
(b)(1) gives an entity with both lawyers and nonlawyers holding financial or
managerial interests a name, the multidisciplinary firm. The
multidisciplinary firm designation distinguishes the entity from law firms or
ABSs and covers all business entity forms employed by law firms.206
Second, section (b)(9) requires that a Certificate of Multidisciplinary Practice
be filed with the Secretary of State of the multidisciplinary firm’s state of
organization. This ensures that a state government has a record of such
entities, and the nonlawyers practicing in those entities, for purposes of
regulation.207 It is also possible that this registration could be used to better
regulate nonlawyer professionals and ensure that unethical nonlawyers are
not permitted to practice in multidisciplinary firms.208 Lastly, the CCC
Model’s choice of law provisions, contained in section (b)(5) also provides
nonlawyers clarity regarding where they may be subject to discipline under
the Rules of Professional Conduct and, thus, which rules they must follow.209
Overall, many of the provisions of the CCC Model make multidisciplinary
practice more predictable and less risky.210

205

Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 170–72.
See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text (discussing the different
terminology used to refer to entities in which lawyers and nonlawyers practice and the
resulting confusion).
207
See supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining the regulation of
multidisciplinary entities in the United Kingdon, where multidisciplinary entities are required
to register as ABSs)
208
See supra note 69 (discussing licensing of engineers, certified public
accountants, and other “business professionals” by many states, including Wisconsin and New
York).
209
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ANN. R. 8.2, 8.5 (including comments).
The comparable provision for lawyers is contained in Model Rule 8.5, governing choice of
law. However, unlike Model Rule 8.2, the choice of law provision governing nonlawyers only
subjects them to discipline in two states, the state of organization of the multidisciplinary firm
and the rules of any tribunal involved in a case for which a nonlawyer provided services.
Since nonlawyers would not otherwise be subject to the jurisdictional powers of a state’s legal
disciplinary authority, but for the fact that they provide services in a multidisciplinary firm,
this limiting of jurisdictional and disciplinary powers to certain defined and specific locations
and rules makes sense. Additionally, the rule provides that nonlawyers waive the right to
object to the jurisdiction of the tribunal on personal jurisdiction grounds. This effectively
shortens the time needed to regulate and litigate these fee disputes. CCC Model 5.4(b)(5).
210
See supra note 165 and accompanying text (describing the unknown ethical
and liability considerations of multidisciplinary practice as a risk management hazard and
practical problem inhibiting the growth of multidisciplinary practices in D.C., particularly
since nonlawyers may only partner with lawyers in that jurisdiction).
206
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C. Challenges with Adopting the CCC Model
Despite its numerous benefits, there are some challenges to adopting
the CCC Model. The rule necessarily contemplates that Rules 1.7 through
1.13 governing conflicts of interest and imputation of conflicts of interest
will be amended.211 Such amendments would be needed to clarify rules
applying to conflicts of interest with past clients, including what is meant by
“materially adverse.”212 Amendments may also allow greater use of
screening, rather than complete disqualification of the multidisciplinary firm
from providing services to a client. Screening is already used, with great
success, for government employees.213
Another particularly tricky area is when nonlawyers in a
multidisciplinary firm are bound by codes of conduct or federal or state laws
specific to their profession, licensure, etc.214 The CCC Model approaches
that conflict by adopting a “client protection” mindset and requiring the
nonlawyer to follow the most restrictive rule.215 Additionally, the CCC
Model requires that nonlawyers adhere to the mandatory disclosure
requirements of their business or profession. Such adherence is again in the
best interests of the public and clients. However, depending on the nature of
the conflict between the lawyer professional rules and the nonlawyer ethics
code, this approach may be overly simple or need modification to comport
with the practical realities of practice.
Finally, given that multidisciplinary practice has been rejected
several times in the years since the adoption of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1983, it is an open question whether the organized
bar will accept such a liberal form of Model Rule 5.4.216 This is especially
true given that the Commission on Ethics 20/20 proposed rule is far more
restrictive than the CCC Model.217 Nevertheless, on the whole, the CCC
Model provides a strong alternative to other models proposed in the past
211

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–1.9; Carson, supra note 65, at
618–20 (describing the problems of conflicts of interest in the multidisciplinary firm, as a
rationale for rejecting the form).
212
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–1.9 (conflicts of interest);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10–1.12 (imputing conflicts of interest and screening
of government employees).
213
BENNETT ET AL., supra note 188, at 184–85, 194–95. Current Rule 1.10 allows
screening in the lateral hire context when the disqualification is based on Rule 1.9(a) or (b).
As commentators have recognized, screening is necessary to avoid the harsh consequences of
imputed conflicts of interest when a lawyer previously performed government work. Id. at
194–95. Those harsh consequences may also provide a rationale for employing screening in
the nonlawyer conflicts context as well, particularly where larger firms with multiple offices
are involved. Id.
214
See CCC Model § 5.4(b)(5) (describing the state professional rules to which
nonlawyers would be subject).
215
CCC Model § 5.4(b)(5).
216
See supra Part II.
217
See supra Part III.C.2.
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thirty years and is a solution that the ABA should seriously consider
reviewing.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the momentum of the rapidly changing legal market and the
growth of legal services providers, it is only a matter of time before the ABA
is forced to confront the issue of multidisciplinary practices.218 The
tremendous history of failed attempts at reform and recent developments
overseas give the ABA multiple models and ethical challenges to consider.219
The CCC Model provides the best proposal for such reform and addresses
significant issues, such as disciplinary authority over nonlawyers,
professional rule conflicts of laws, and additional client protections for
commercial versus consumer clients.220 Above all, the CCC Model
introduces structured flexibility into American multidisciplinary structures,
where other proposed models have been too rigid to be practical.221
In the end, as Elijah D. Farrell has recognized, “resolution of the
current dissonance may be “driven less by lawyers’ own notions of ethical
propriety than by the demands of clients in the modern global
marketplace.”222 Let us hope that reform comes through the contractual pen
and consumer-commercial contrast, rather than through inaction or overly
restrictive regulation.

218

See generally Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3 (discussing the rapidly
changing legal marketplace); Hackett, supra note 109 (describing current trends toward legal
service providers and the quick shift to more technology-based forms of providing legal
services).
219
See supra Parts II–III.
220
See supra Part IV.
221
See supra Part IV; see also supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Commission on
Ethics 20/20 Model).
222
Farrell, supra note 62, at 627–28.
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